Lecture on the Peninsula Campaign of the American Civil War 2024EXPIRED

Public Lecture - John Morrison

Despite success with blockade of Southern Ports and in the Western Theatre and Mississippi Valley, the first major battle of the Civil War, First Bull Run/Manassas in July 1861, was a humiliating defeat for the Union. Despite superior numbers and resources, the Union Army was humiliated, disorganized and morale had plummeted. Enter General George Brinton McClellan, “Little Mac”, who transformed the demoralized Union Army of the Potomac. But by late 1861, there was no indication of how or when he might strike against the Confederate army nearby at Manassas, leading President Abraham Lincoln to press the general for a plan of action against the Confederate capital in Richmond. The result was the Peninsula Campaign − one of the war's most pivotal events.  

McClellan believed Richmond held the fate of the Confederacy, but rather than march overland toward the Confederate capital he proposed a move against Richmond using the York-James Peninsula of Virginia − one of two major approaches to the Confederate capital at Richmond. McClellan thought that by using Fort Monroe (the only fort in the Upper South not to fall into Confederate hands) as a base, “the Army of the Potomac could march against Richmond with complete security, altho' with less celebrity and brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula."  

The plan represented a sound strategic concept − employing a shrewd exploitation of Union naval superiority, since gunboats could protect flanks and river steamers could carry troops toward the Confederate capital. And since Richmond was vital to the Confederacy, the Confederate Army would have to give battle to the North. 

But there were limitations. The Chickahominy River ran roughly through the middle of the northern Peninsula near Richmond. Limited fords and crossings necessitated dividing the army at some stages. Only one adequate supply line existed for the Upper Peninsula − the Richmond & York River Railroad − which became McClellan’s lifeline. The terrain lent itself to defense by a small force − especially one that knew the region well (as many Confederates did).  

But perhaps most seriously, the Union had underestimated Confederate ingenuity and fighting spirit.